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Seven and a half cents doesn’t mean a thing.
But give it to me every hour, forty hours every week,
That’s enough for me to be living like a king.

– The Pajama Game (1954)

The effects of compounding are also quite relevant to foundations in, among other things,
correctly accounting for inflation — for purposes
including determining the appropriate return
targets and levels of risk in managing endowment assets, analyzing the feasibility of perpetual
versus spend-down strategies, and comparing
amounts invested in program areas over time.
There is clearly a powerful compounding effect
of inflation on a foundation’s endowment. (See
Figure 1.) Beginning with a hypothetical foundation’s investment portfolio in 1985, after 30 years

Sector

Introduction
Lord Rothschild proclaimed compound interest
to be the “eighth wonder of the world.” Warren
Buffett reportedly often skipped haircuts as a
young man because of his calculation of the
future contribution to his retirement funds from
the money saved given what he projected as
investment returns on these savings compounding over several decades. These two highly
sophisticated investors correctly appreciated the
importance over time of compounding effects on
future asset levels.

Key Points
•• This article demonstrates the relevance of
correctly accounting for inflation to foundation structure and programs – including,
for example, in analyzing perpetual versus
spend-down strategies and in comparing
the cost-effectiveness of programs over different time periods. Investment teams must
also be provided with return targets, which
are highly sensitive to inflation and which in
turn determine a risk estimate that must be
considered by foundation fiduciaries.
•• Seemingly small differences in inflation
estimates will become material over time.
But at many foundations, systematic biases
are frequently built into inflation estimates.
These biases are often attributable to a
failure to consider the nature of the costs
specific to types of grantees and programs.
•• This article presents data illustrating the
potential magnitude of these differences,
and suggests adjustments to better account
for these attributes as well as how these
adjustments should be applied in projecting
future results and in interpreting prior period
performance.
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FIGURE 1 Effect of Inflation on Real Value of Endowment
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— in 2015 — the effects of inflation at the average
rate that has prevailed in the U.S. for the last 20
years (2.26 percent) would reduce the real value
of that portfolio by approximately 50 percent.
The reduction is even greater at the inflation rate
that actually prevailed over the entire 30-year
period: 2.7 percent.
Purchasing power is hopefully maintained, of
course, by earning a return on the portfolio
equal to or greater than the rate of inflation (plus
earning enough to cover the effective 5 percent
mandatory rate of distribution). Seemingly small
mistakes in predicting inflation, if subjected
to the effects of compounding over time, can
become material.1 Indeed, what may seem to be
an inconsequential concern can have a considerable effect on the long-term view of how valuable
philanthropic assets are best leveraged for grantees. Systematic biases built into a foundation’s

estimate of inflation in considering the real purchasing power of its asset base can, over time,
detract meaningfully from the accuracy of such
estimates. Foundations that believe they are on
a path to ensuring perpetual or long-term operations may be spending down without realizing it.
An error of only 50 basis points in predicting
inflation would materially affect the important
target that must be set in terms of the necessary
return — and quite significantly, therefore, the
amount of risk — on which investment strategies
must be based to preserve purchasing power.
After 15 years and 30 years, respectively, such
an error — again using 1985 as the base year
and the average inflation rate for that 30 years
— would have caused the return necessary to
offset the erosion of purchasing power due to
inflation to be underestimated by more than 9
percent at the end of 15 years and approximately

Prez, the union leader in The Pajama Game, saw this clearly. He sought a 7-1/2-cent hourly increase, which by itself would
have produced $9,432 in additional earnings over the period from the week in May 1954, when the musical debuted on
Broadway, through the end of December 2015 — a healthy accumulation, given this very modest salary increase, but
somewhat limited in aggregate amount. But assuming a historically reasonable 6 percent equity rate of return on this small
raise continuously compounded, that amount grows more than 10-fold, to $105,245. Even taking inflation into account —
assuming Prez neglected to negotiate an inflation-adjusted increase and using a 3 percent estimate of inflation for the period
— that amount still grows to $27,866 in real purchasing power (i.e., 1954 dollars), though the potent effect of accounting for
even only a 3 percent inflation rate is obvious. As further discussed in this note, underestimating inflation by 50 basis points
(i.e., if the costs experienced by Prez’s union members actually increased annually by 3.5 percent rather than 3 percent) would
reduce the constant dollar value of the deal Prez negotiated by 18 percent, to $22,824.

1
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Value of Endowment (1985 = 100)

FIGURE 2 Effect of Error in Prediction of Rate of Inflation

Effect of Error in Prediction of Rate of Inflation

100

Inflation Rate
Avg. 1995−2015

75

Avg. 1985−2015
Avg. 1995−2015 +50 bps*
Avg. 1985−2015 +50 bps
50

1985

1990

1995

2000

Year

2005

2010

2015

*bps = basis points

What Type of Grantee?
The common denominator among the simple
steps suggested here is the introduction into a
foundation’s investment policies of certain considerations concerning the types of grantee organizations served by the foundation. For several
reasons, the inflation confronted by many grantees can, and likely does, vary materially from
general macroeconomic price indices. This is not
to say, however, that a foundation needs to examine with great particularity the specific effects of
inflation on each grantee. Several general factors can be incorporated into the foundation’s
inflation outlook to account for much of the

difference between inflation as it is relevant to
the foundation’s particular mission and price considerations which may apply for the economy as a
whole but not for the grantee base in question.
This is also not to suggest that a foundation’s
aggregate annual grantmaking should somehow be tied to measures of inflation in the interests of the organizational sustainability of the
nonprofits it supports, however desirable this
might be. The reality is that most foundations,
other than those in spend-down mode, focus first
on meeting basic minimum distribution requirements with perhaps some adjustment on aggregate grantmaking based on actual investment
results. But a step in every foundation’s strategy
is the construction of an investment portfolio
to maintain real purchasing power if the foundation aims to exist in perpetuity or over an
extended period.
This requires setting an investment returns target, which in turn determines a risk estimate
that a foundation must consider in analyzing
whether the return target is prudent as a matter
of financial stewardship. This is unavoidable.
Endowment managers cannot be left to “do the
best they can”; they necessarily require return
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 111
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15 percent after 30 years. (See Figure 2.) There
is reason to believe that such a 50-basis-point
error is far less than the systematic biases that
actually affect foundation predictions. Also, the
calculation here does not take into account the
5 percent distribution requirement for all foundations, which further affects the pressure on
investment returns as further discussed in the
analysis below. Fortunately, however, a foundation can take relatively simple steps to incorporate important considerations into its analysis of
inflation to reduce the likelihood of at least some
of this inherent bias.

Ettinger

Any underestimate of the
long-term degradation of
purchasing power due to
inflation could materially add
to the failure to reflect fully
the difficult hurdles faced by a
foundation’s spending policy
over extended periods.
targets, which turn in part on the degree of
acceptable risk given the risk-reward alternatives
that characterize portfolio management.

Sector

From all this follow two key points: First, a
return target that systematically underestimates
inflationary pressures each year, enhanced by the
effect of compounding, will have material consequences on the ability to maintain purchasing
power even if the annual underestimates appear
to be small. Second, factoring into the analysis
some measure of the general nature of differing
inflation faced by categories of grantees is necessary to avoid such annual underestimates.
Now it is certainly the case that a given group
of foundation stewards may review the level of
return required to maintain purchasing power, as
measured by their set of grantees, and the associated level of portfolio risk that would have to be
assumed to achieve that level and conclude that
it is imprudent to adopt such portfolio strategy.
They may quite reasonably conclude to make
fewer, smaller, and/or shorter grants as the dollar
level of the endowment and grantmaking decline
in real terms. But over the long term, for these
stewards or their successors, this is a decision to
accept a shrinking foundation with, at least in theory, an end-date to material grantmaking. There

is, of course, nothing wrong with such a conclusion and it may in many cases be the prudent
course. But such a decision should at the very
least be an explicit one. Because it is easy to overlook the compounding effect of seemingly small
annual underestimates of inflation and/or to fail
to account for the inflation which a foundation,
given its mission, actually confronts, it is easy
for foundation executives to fail to see that their
market returns are “low” even if they exceed the
5 percent return roughly required to cover annual
minimum distributions, and that their assets are
therefore “shrinking” in real terms.
With respect to the compounding effect of systematically underestimating inflation, an annual
inflation estimate that is, for example, too low
by only 75 basis points — again less, as discussed
below, than some of the built-in biases may suggest — would mean that at current historically
low inflation rates, after 10 years the foundation’s
assets would be less than 93 percent of what is
required to maintain purchasing power and
after 20 years would be only 86 percent of that
amount.2 And this may go unrecognized, as such
foundations rarely go back to reassess purchasing
power in comparison with the real value of the
endowment in prior periods.
Foundations, given minimum distribution
requirements, will typically set an investment
target in the form of 5 percent plus some longterm inflation projection. Such a calculation may
already somewhat understate the task facing the
investment team, as a portion of expenses —
such as investment expenses and excise taxes (on
net investment income) — do not count toward
the foundation’s 5 percent minimum distribution
requirement, despite the fact that these are real,
unavoidable costs depleting assets. Any underestimate of the long-term degradation of purchasing power due to inflation could materially add
to the failure to reflect fully the difficult hurdles
faced by a foundation’s spending policy over
extended periods.

2
For purposes of this calculation, an inflation rate of 2.26 percent (the actual average U.S. rate for 1995-2015) was compared
with an estimate that adjusted inflation by 75 basis points higher (3.61 percent). Adding these rates to the 5 percent required
minimum distribution produced a difference in the amount necessary to preserve real purchasing power (and assuming that
the 5 percent required distributions are made at the same rate over the course of the year as returns are earned on the asset
base) of $94,799 after 10 years on a $1 million endowment, reflecting an underestimate of inflation by 27.5 percent ($345,275
versus $250,476).
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What Measure of Inflation?

The most general factor that needs to be (but
rarely is) incorporated into a foundation’s thinking about inflation is that many — likely most
— grantees are labor-intensive enterprises. As
such they do not enjoy the productivity increases
accruing to capital-intensive (especially technology-intensive) enterprises. Thus, their costs can be
expected to rise at a higher rate than the general
level of inflation. As a general matter, then, foundations should consider adding some reasonable
premium to traditional macroeconomic indices
of inflation in order to model more accurately
what is required to maintain purchasing power
from the perspective of their grantees.
Beyond this broadly applicable characteristic
of labor intensity, for some grantees there may
be specialized indices that capture additional
elements of the cost environment faced by a

measures cost specific to educational institutions.
Heavily weighted towards salaries and other
personnel costs, over its 46-year history HEPI
advanced at a rate approximately 1.4% per annum
in excess of the GNP deflator. Lack of productivity
gains in education account for the greater inflation
and academic costs. (Swenson, 2000, p. 34)

Not surprisingly, Yale uses the HEPI as the basis
for determining the investment returns necessary to produce constant purchasing power by its
endowment. In some recent years, the HEPI has
more closely approached the CPI. In fact, in 2011
the HEPI was lower than the CPI by more than
70 basis points. This historical anomaly was due
to the structural endowment deficits produced
by the 2008 economic crisis and the resulting
response of educational institutions in the form
of budget and hiring freezes. Over long periods,
however, the pattern has been the one noted by
Swenson of HEPI rates of inflation materially in
excess of those measured by the CPI. For the fiveyear period ending in 2015, the HEPI was up a
cumulative 11.2 percent versus 8 percent for CPI,
notwithstanding the aforementioned abnormally
low increases in the HEPI in some recent years.
In 2014 and 2015, for example, the HEPI exceeded
the CPI by more than the historical increment
of 1.4 percent. A misestimate of 1.4 percent in
the inflation estimate would mean that over
the course of only 20 years a foundation would
shrink by almost a quarter of its real asset value
if it had been pursuing and achieving an investment return objective of 5 percent plus CPI.
Other examples are plentiful of foundations that,
by virtue of the nature of their programs and the
specific cost considerations faced by their grantees, should perhaps consider adding a further
premium on general rates of inflation in their
modeling of the long-term effects of inflation
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 113
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Many foundations, in adding an inflation component to their target returns, use some version
of the projected Consumer Price Index (CPI),
some long-term estimate of the gross domestic
product (GDP)-deflator, or some other general
macroeconomic measure, such as the spreads
between market rates and inflation-protected
market rates, all of which have strengths and
weaknesses as a measure. The CPI, for example,
is based on a specific basket of roughly 80 goods
or services, which likely do not accurately reflect
the costs grantees must face. Core inflation, CPIbased indices used by some philanthropic entities, exclude gas and food prices. While using a
core inflation index is justifiable in terms of economic theory, grantees may well have to drive
and eat. As suggested in an example below, however, the core index may be appropriate — for
certain purposes, as long as it is not employed
as the full inflation factor. Even GDP-deflator
indices, which use all prices of goods and services throughout the economy, do not accurately
reflect the specialized costs affecting many types
of grantees. The same can be said of projecting
inflation through market spreads, such as those
between long-term Treasuries and those that
are indexed to protect the holder against the
effects of inflation — so-called Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities.

foundation’s grantees. To take a specific example, foundations funding projects associated with
educational institutions may be well advised
to consider the Higher Education Price Index
(HEPI) rather than the CPI as a means of estimating long-term inflation. As David Swensen,
the brilliantly successful manager of the Yale
endowment, has noted, the HEPI
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FIGURE 3 Various Inflation Indices
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on their purchasing power. One case would be
foundations that make a significant investment
in buildings or other items requiring major construction projects. Construction inflation indices,
though volatile and perhaps cyclical, often run
higher than regular CPI inflation, on the order of
75 to 100 basis points or more per year. Thus, for
example, during the period of 2009–2015 the construction index has recorded compound inflation
of 16.5 percent, or 700 basis points higher than
the CPI (9.5 percent).
Another example might be foundations that fund
scientific or medical research. The specific inflation-index calculated for research expenditures,
the Biomedical Research and Development Price
Index (BRDPI), tends to run consistently higher
than traditional inflation indices. During the
same 2009–2015 period, for example, this index
has increased by 14.2 percent, more than 4 percent greater than the CPI. Such a differential,
especially over an extended period, would cause
a foundation that fails to account for the specific
inflation environment faced by its grantees to
underestimate seriously the investment returns
required to preserve constant purchasing power.
There are certain specific reasons why the
BRDPI may not work well to capture a specific
114 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

foundation’s inflation situation, but measurement problems do not justify entirely excluding
such a consideration from long-term planning.
As a general matter there is material variation in
the compounding growth rates of different inflation indices over time. (See Figure 3.)
It should be noted that there are no well-established forecasts of the HEPI, biomedical cost
indices, or construction costs. This is admittedly different from the CPI, where there are
direct or inferred values for future expectations.
This is not, however, a justification for reverting to the use of the CPI for forward-looking
measures of the returns necessary to preserve
actual purchasing power. (This is distinct from
assessments looking back at whether purchasing power has been preserved or, as discussed
below, to analyze amounts previously granted,
where historical measures are readily available.)
As a practical matter, then, although a foundation may be forced to start with CPI expectations
to determine the desired endowment returns,
a premium should be added to that calculated
with reference to historical experience. Various
academic institutions, for example, in budgeting
for future construction costs, grow those costs
to account for inflation at expected CPI plus a

Why Some Perpetual Foundations Aren’t (Perpetual)

FIGURE 4 Adjusted Rates of Inflation
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A potentially very important consideration in
grantee-specific inflationary pressures involves
not the nature of the work, but instead the location of the grantee. This arises for foundations
engaged in international grantmaking. Inflation
rates outside the U.S., particularly in the developing world, often run several percentage points
higher per year than in the U.S. To some extent,
exchange-rate adjustments will offset the higher
inflation rate. But the offset is far from perfect.
Exchange rates vary for reasons other than just
the comparative rates of inflation, including
government and central bank policy, interest rate
differentials, trade balances, and other economic
considerations. To account for this the World

Bank calculates a Purchasing Power Parity Index
by country in order to assist those in one country in budgeting their funding, with the goal
of maintaining constant purchasing power for
their projects when costs will be denominated in
another currency.
The effects here can certainly be material. Take
the hypothetical example of a U.S. foundation
that makes grants in Ecuador, Israel, Bolivia,
Nigeria, India, and Vietnam (selected for illustrative purposes both because of their geographical diversity and the diversity in their locally
calculated rates of inflation). Assume grants
were made in these jurisdictions between 2010
and 2014. During this period — and assuming,
for simplicity, grants of equal amounts — the
portion of the foundation’s endowment supporting these grants had to cope with compound
aggregate inflation of 71.24 percent during
those years versus a CPI increase of only 8.5
percent.3 Adjusted annual average inflation rates
for each of the six foreign countries ran from

3
The calculation of the “real” inflation rate (net of exchange-rate adjustments) was derived by dividing the compounded
cumulative CPI for 2010-2015 by the change in the relevant exchange rate (i.e., the number of units of local currency per US$
on Dec. 31, 2015, divided by the same exchange rate value of Jan. 1, 2010). For Ecuador, whose local currency is the dollar, this
meant that the real compounded inflation rate for the period was the full 16.8 percent experienced in the local economy. An
alternative calculation could be derived using the World Bank’s Purchasing Power Parity Index.
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specified number of basis points. Such academic
institutions therefore should, in determining the
investment returns necessary to preserve the
purchasing power of their endowments, grow at
least the pro rata portion of their required investment returns allocable to construction expenses
by this higher level of inflation expectations.

Ettinger

For a foundation adopting or
considering a perpetual model,
an awareness that returns of
more than 8 percent might
be required to maintain its
purchasing power in perpetuity
is only the beginning, not the
end, of an important analysis
and delicate balancing act.

Sector

a low of 1.64 percent to a high of 15.1 percent,
again contrasted with the U.S. average of 1.52
percent. This reflects considerable pressure on
the endowment not reflected in a U.S.-indexed
model. (See Figure 4.)
Hedging options, which might be desirable
from the grantee’s perspective to ensure that it
receives a constant amount denominated in local
currency, would simply make the grantee subject
entirely to the domestic inflation rate without
the possibility of a potential partial offset from
exchange-rate movements. Again, the point here
is not that a foundation needs to attempt to grow
its annual grantmaking capacity to hold grantees harmless from the effects of such inflation.
Rather, the inevitable moral of this story is that
given the true inflation faced by such grantees,
their donors must either calibrate their endowment-management targets (and risk assumptions)
to take this into account or accept that, given an
international mission, the real value of their asset
base will decline — perhaps sharply — over time.

Which Model – Perpetual
or Spend-Down?
Beyond issues associated with the management
of a foundation’s endowment, the issue of compounding and inflation may also relate to a fundamental question of foundation existence. A
growing number of foundations and sponsors
are considering the relative merits of seeking to
116 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

remain in existence in perpetuity versus a spenddown model. Obviously, spending down over a
short period of time may largely avoid the inflation issue. The possible higher inflation rates if
one takes a grantee-specific approach to calculating anticipated inflation over time may therefore
be a significant factor in tipping the balance of
that analysis.
The current economic environment would not
appear to offer a great degree of optimism for
maintaining purchasing power over the long
term for most foundations. A grantee-specific
inflation rate of even only 75 basis points over
the CPI, given the Federal Reserve inflation target of 2 percent and allowing for expenses and
excise taxes not includable in the IRS’s minimum
distribution requirements plus the 5 percent minimum distribution, might suggest a return target
of 8 percent or more. Of course, if anticipated
rates of return on investment even approach the
grantee-adjusted rate of anticipated inflation plus
5 percent (plus possibly some additional amount
for expenses and taxes that are not includable),
that might be an important factor arguing for
continuing existence. While at times bull equity
markets may have made 8 percent seem like a
conceivable — although not likely — target, the
consensus view now would almost certainly be
to bet “the under” on achieving that target going
forward (at an acceptable level of risk) given the
fundamentals and growth issues being experienced by most developed and developing economies. Again, this analysis suggests that even
foundations that, due to board decision or the
requirements of founding documents, believe
they are on the road to perpetuity may in fact be
spending down without awareness of that fact.
For a foundation adopting or considering a
perpetual model, an awareness that returns of
more than 8 percent might be required to maintain its purchasing power in perpetuity is only
the beginning, not the end, of an important
analysis and delicate balancing act. It should
trigger an iterative process of assessing endowment return targets, acceptable risk levels, and
the structure and duration of program portfolios. What does an 8-plus percent target imply
for expected endowment volatility, the ability to

Why Some Perpetual Foundations Aren’t (Perpetual)

comfortably meet commitments, and projected
spending rates?

Such a foundation may be well advised to have
some “swing” capacity in its programs, i.e.,
short-term commitments that could be rapidly reduced in the event endowment volatility
requires decreased spending for a time. These
could be either in the mix of initiatives within
each program or separate programs recognized
as providing the necessary swing capacity.
Again, it is also possible that return targets that
include a premium for cost increases actually

Inflation rates are, of course, not the sole criteria
that comes into play in balancing the issues associated with the choice between the perpetual and
the spend-down models. But reduction in purchasing power due to inflation is likely among
the more potent factors if the decision is to be
made solely on an economic basis of maximizing
social utility. And the importance of an awareness of whether or not one is spending down on
real purchasing power seems unquestionable.

What Type of Initiative?
Considering the inflation issue from a different
direction, many foundations are now subjecting
their programs to cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis in comparing alternative initiatives.
Although a wide range of approaches with significant variance in the degree of economic explicitness are used for these purposes, those analyses
turn either analytically or conceptually on some
sense of the amounts invested in the programs.
Particularly for long-term programs, all invested
amounts should be brought forward into current
dollars in order to make consistent comparisons
among alternative programs. The compounding
effect of inflation rates (in this case, revaluing
upwards previously invested amounts) potentially will make a material difference in the relative amounts invested if alternative initiatives are
to be considered on a consistent basis.
In general, the adjustments called for by all of the
above analysis can be quite simple in practice yet
still add meaningfully to a foundation’s ability
to model the economic environment in which
it functions. Consider, just as one example, a
foundation based in a major metropolitan area
whose programs are mostly in that urban area
and are of the direct-services type. In accounting
for inflation, such a foundation might wish to
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 117
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Higher return targets necessarily imply greater
projected portfolio volatility. Although riskier
portfolios can be constructed with an expected
return at these higher levels, the price of these
higher expected returns is higher volatility, i.e.,
less certainty that the target will be what is actually realized (otherwise, the portfolio would
not be “riskier”). It is true that this volatility
runs in both directions. It may be reasonable to
assume that you are just as likely to beat your
target as to fall short. But there is an important
asymmetry here: It is always easier to spend
more money without long-term commitments
than it is to adapt, in a relatively short time
frame, to a reduction in available funds when
returns fall short. Foundation fiduciaries are
well-advised to consider these possibilities in
advance rather than when the storm has arrived.
Stress testing can be useful here. What payout
rates would follow from an x percent decline
in endowment value? Are these rates acceptable? Program personnel need to be involved
in these analyses. What would the program
reaction be if funds available for grants declined
by x percent for even a few years? Is the mix of
short-term and longer-term commitments such
that there is the flexibility to respond quickly to
sub-target investment returns, or is the foundation effectively locked in and forced to accept a
higher spend rate of, say, 6 percent, 7 percent,
or more even for a few years? These questions
all become of heightened importance for a foundation that is trying to exceed, after accounting
for distributions, ordinary inflation rates in its
investment returns due to grantee-specific cost
considerations.

experienced by grantees simply imply too much
risk and associated volatility. Foundation fiduciaries could quite sensibly and prudently reach that
conclusion and set investment targets lower. But
then a foundation adopting this view is in reality
a spend-down organization, and must recognize
that in its program strategy given the long-run
legal mandates of spending at 5 percent plus
uncovered expenses per year.

Ettinger
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use core CPI (that is, the CPI without energy and
food), plus an amount reflecting recently prevailing HEPI premiums over general inflation.
This would capture both that gas utilization is
much lower in most major metropolitan areas
than in the U.S. generally and that grantees of
this nature are almost certainly labor intensive.
(Alternatively, there are now a variety of urban
indices which might merit consideration, but
“core” versions of these indices — e.g., minus
energy and food — may not be available.) To this
should be added 25 to 50 basis points for taxes or
expenses that are not includable. Keep in mind
also that there is a difference between price levels, which may be higher in this metro area than
in the nation as a whole, and percentage changes
in price levels due to inflation. The base price
level for this foundation should be thought of
as reflecting these higher urban costs and, if the
program focus should change to jurisdictions
with different cost levels, the base in effect could
be readjusted.
As this example illustrates, some relatively
straightforward analysis of the grantee portfolio can be important. To begin, is that portfolio
in fact characterized by greater labor intensity? Then, are there other factors, commodities, or specific costs of particular relevance?
Construction or infrastructure costs, food prices,
and costs associated with scientific research
(which can swing widely, in both directions,
from standard CPI measures) would all be examples here. Are considerations of location important, as in the different pricing environments
faced by urban, suburban, or rural grantees? In
particular, in the case of grantmaking in other
countries, actual inflation in the relevant economy (after adjustment for exchange-rate changes)
is what determines purchasing power parity.
These inflation considerations can also play a
meaningful role in setting important strategic
paths for a foundation. In considering the pros
and cons of perpetual versus spend-down models, and in determining where one actually is
on the spectrum defined by those two models, a
realistic premium to the general level of inflation
should, where appropriate, be incorporated into
the thinking. At least in the current economic
118 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

environment, the return target (and the associated risk levels that would need to be accepted
to, on average, achieve that target) may be an
important factor. Further, in comparing alternative initiatives with respect to historical or
projected outcome performance, constant dollar
calculations should be used to provide a consistent method of comparison.
These points may all be, at least per year, relatively small, but they can amount to important
effects. After all, a 7 1/2-cent raise was at the
center of The Pajama Game, which ended up
winning the 1954 Tony Award for Best Musical.
Small amounts can tell an interesting story.
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